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* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 




 Carlos Zuniga appeals the District Court’s orders granting Appellees’ motion for 
summary judgment and denying his motion filed pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b).  For 
the reasons below, we will affirm the District Court’s judgment. 
 Zuniga, a federal prisoner, alleged in his complaint that prison officials failed to 
protect him from assault.  He asserted that he informed his case manager and his unit 
manager in January 2015 of threats and extortion by prison gang members.  Zuniga 
claimed that the prison officials disclosed his allegations to two of the gang members, 
Chavez and Hernandez, who then charged Zuniga a higher monthly extortion fee of $50.  
Zuniga does not allege that he filed any grievances at that time challenging the prison 
officials’ purported disclosure of his allegations to gang members. 
Four months later, on May 14, 2015, Chavez and Hernandez purportedly assaulted 
Zuniga, telling him that the reason for the assault was because he had complained to 
prison officials about them.  On May 25, 2015, Hernandez and three other gang members 
advised Zuniga to leave that prison.  Zuniga alleged that he then went to a prison 
official’s office and requested protection.  When Zuniga refused to leave the official’s 
office, he was escorted to the Special Housing Unit (SHU).1  He asserted that upon his 
 
 
1 According to an incident report Zuniga submitted in support of his complaint, he told 
staff that he could not return to his housing unit but would not say why; there was no 





arrival to the SHU, a correctional officer noticed his bruises, and Zuniga reported the 
assault.2 
Zuniga alleged that two Special Investigative Supervisors (SIS) interviewed him 
but failed to make a report or charge Chavez and Hernandez with assault.3  Zuniga also 
asserted that he was kept in the SHU unlawfully for seven months until he was 
transferred.   
 Appellees filed a motion to dismiss or, in the alternative, for summary judgment.  
They argued that Zuniga had not exhausted his administrative remedies as required by 42 
U.S.C. § 1997e(a) and that some of his allegations failed to state a claim.  In March 2018, 
the District Court granted the Appellees’ motion for summary judgment.  It determined 
 
2 According to the prison’s investigation, Zuniga did not report the assault upon being 
sent to the SHU on May 26.  Rather, he reported it almost a week later on June 1.  When 
he was assessed for injuries, only minor bruising was noted. 
 
3 Prison officials determined that Zuniga’s allegations of assault were false after  
watching footage from prison cameras:  “[Zuniga] provided dates and times of when he 
was allegedly assaulted by other [members of the inmate gang]. The times provided by 
[Zuniga] to the SIS Lieutenant changed frequently. The SIS Lieutenant watched all times 
and dates via CCTV that were identified by [Zuniga] and found that all times and dates 
were false.”  The investigator also interviewed Zuniga as well as several other inmates.  
According to the Investigative Report, Zuniga was causing tension between his gang and 
another prison gang.  His gang asked him to leave general population to keep the peace.  
According to the investigator, Zuniga stated that he wanted to associate with another 
prison gang and the leader of his former gang gave his blessing.  He alleged that he was 
assaulted by Chavez and Hernandez (members of his former gang) in May 2015 but he 
did not say anything.  The investigator did not report any statements by Zuniga that 
prison officials endangered him by sharing his allegations with gang members.  Zuniga 
did not assert, as he did in his complaint, that Chavez and Hernandez told him they 




that Zuniga failed to exhaust his administrative remedies for his claim that prison 
officials failed to protect him.  It also concluded that his allegations against one Appellee 
failed to allege any personal involvement and that Appellees were entitled to summary 
judgment on Zuniga’s allegations of unlawful SHU confinement.4  Zuniga then filed a 
timely motion for relief from judgment pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(6).  The District 
Court denied the Rule 60(b) motion, and Zuniga filed a timely notice of appeal.  We have 
jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.        
I. Exhaustion 
We exercise de novo review over the District Court’s determinations that Zuniga 
failed to exhaust his administrative remedies.  Robinson v. Superintendent Rockview 
SCI, 831 F.3d 148, 153 (3d Cir. 2016).  A grant of summary judgment will be affirmed if 
our review reveals that “there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the 
movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”  Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).     
A prisoner may not file a Bivens action until he has exhausted available 
administrative remedies.  See 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a); Nyhuis v. Reno, 204 F.3d 65, 68 (3d 
Cir. 2000).  “Proper exhaustion demands compliance with an agency’s deadlines and 
 
 
4 We will affirm the District Court’s judgment with respect to Zuniga’s remaining claims 
for the reasons given by the District Court.  These claims do not merit further discussion.  
See Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 484 (1995) (liberty interests requiring procedural 
due process limited to freedom from restraints that impose “atypical and significant 





other critical procedural rules because no adjudicative system can function effectively 
without imposing some orderly structure on the course of its proceedings.”  Woodford v. 
Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 90-91 (2006).  Failure to exhaust is an affirmative defense for the 
defendants to plead and prove.  Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 216 (2007). 
 Under the BOP’s administrative grievance procedures, an inmate must first try to 
resolve his issue informally with staff.  28 C.F.R. § 542.13.  Zuniga satisfied this first 
step when on October 20, 2015, he filed an informal resolution form, alleging that staff 
members failed to protect him from an assault by two inmates and requested that those 
inmates be disciplined for the assault.5  On October 29, 2015, a staff member stated that 
the issue could not be resolved informally and issued Zuniga a BP-9 form to file an initial 
grievance.   
If the inmate cannot resolve the issue informally, he may file a written complaint 
within twenty days of the date of the occurrence on which the complaint is based.  Id. 
§ 542.14(a).  An extension of the twenty-day period may be allowed if the inmate 
“demonstrates a valid reason for delay.”  Id. § 542.14(b).  On October 30, 2015, nine 
months after he spoke with his case manager and unit manager and five months after the 
 
5 Zuniga stated in his informal grievance: “concerning safety issue a duty upon prison off. 
to protect prisoners from violence at the hands of other a substantial risk of serious harm 
to an inmate staff members are in violation of program statement 3420.09 standard ethic 
conduct for employees for [failure] to report to SIS or protect inmate Zuniga from harm a 
substantial risk when Zuniga report the Chavez and Hernandez threatens and abuses 
harasses us [failure]Zuniga was [assaulted].  Charge inmate’s Chavez and Hernandez 




alleged assault, Zuniga filed the BP-9 form.  His grievance did not request an extension 
of the time to file or give a reason for any delay.  He stated that the staff members failed 
to report his concerns to the SIS and failed to protect him from physical assault:   
I did not agree with the counselor’s response.  When I first report the 
incident to staff members I put my life and safety in harms way.  [Failure] 
to take charge of this incident on time later led to me being assaulted by 
Chavez and Hernandez.  Concerning safety issues, it’s a prison officials job 
to protect prisoners from violence at the hands of other inmates.  Staff 
members are in violation of program statement 3420.09, standards of 
employee conduct for [failure] to report to S.I.S. or protect inmate Zuniga 
from any harm.  When Zuniga reported Chavez and Hernandez wrong 
doing it seems the prison officials still failed in there duties to protect 
Zuniga from physical assault.  To resolve my complaint and find a solution 
I want inmate Chavez and Hernandez charged with assault of inmate 
Zuniga on or about the month of May. 
 
 In their statement of material facts, Appellees asserted that the initial grievance 
was rejected as untimely and submitted a prison grievance report listing all of Zuniga’s 
grievances for the relevant time period.  The report indicated that the initial grievance had 
been given the number #841063-F1 and was rejected as untimely on November 3, 2015.  
In his objections to Appellees’ statement of material facts, Zuniga responded generally 
that he had timely followed the steps of the grievance process but that the Appellees 
obstructed the process by sending his grievances back to him.  He did not specifically 
respond to the Appellees’ assertion that the initial grievance was rejected as untimely.  
He did not acknowledge the first grievance or supply a copy of the prison officials’ 





On November 9, 2015, Zuniga resubmitted the grievance which was given the 
number #841063-F2.6  The Warden responded that he understood Zuniga to be claiming 
he had been assaulted and was requesting more investigation.  The Warden noted that an 
extensive SIS investigation was conducted and the investigators had concluded that 
Zuniga’s allegations were not reliable and unfounded.  He noted that the response was for 
informational purposes only. 
II. Summary Judgment 
 Upon initial review of the appeal, the Clerk instructed the parties to brief several 
issues, including whether the prison mailbox rule applies to the BOP’s grievance system.7  
On appeal, Appellees argue that we need not reach the issue of whether the prison 
mailbox rule applies to grievance appeals because the District Court determined that 
Zuniga’s initial grievance was untimely.  Thus, they argue, the District Court’s order may 
be affirmed on that ground.  Zuniga did not respond to Appellees’ argument in his reply 
brief. 
 
6 The copy of the grievance Zuniga submitted reflects that it was received on November 
3, 2015, and re-received on November 9, 2015.  The number of the grievance was 
originally 841063-F1 but the 1 was crossed out and replaced by a “2,” presumably when 
it was resubmitted. 
 
7 Zuniga’s appeal of the rejection of his grievance was eventually rejected as untimely.  
He argues that the appeal was timely filed under the prison mailbox rule of Houston v. 





 We agree that the District Court’s order may be affirmed on the ground that 
Zuniga failed to timely file his initial grievance; thus, he did not properly exhaust his 
administrative remedies.  As described above, Zuniga did not specifically dispute 
Appellees’ assertion that his first grievance was rejected as untimely or claim any 
exception to the grievance deadline.  He did not acknowledge the first grievance or 
supply a copy of the prison officials’ response to that first grievance.  Based on the record 
before it, the District Court did not err in granting summary judgment as there was no 
genuine dispute as to whether Zuniga timely filed his initial grievance and Appellees 
were entitled to summary judgment on the ground that Zuniga failed to properly exhaust 
his administrative remedies.8 
 
8 In his reply brief, Zuniga argues that his allegations state a claim under the Eighth 
Amendment.  However, even if the allegations of the initial grievance were considered 
properly exhausted, those allegations do not likely state a plausible claim for failure to 
protect.  To do so, an inmate must allege facts that demonstrate that “(1) he was 
incarcerated under conditions posing a substantial risk of serious harm, (2) the official 
was deliberately indifferent to that substantial risk to his health and safety, and (3) the 
official’s deliberate indifference caused him harm.”  Bistrian v. Levi, 696 F.3d 352, 367 
(3d Cir. 2012).  Not every injury inflicted by one inmate on another creates a 
constitutional liability for prison officials.  Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994).  
It is not enough for a plaintiff to offer only conclusory allegations or a simple recital of 
the elements of a claim.  Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). 
Zuniga asserted in his grievance that he reported an undescribed incident to 
unnamed staff members who failed to refer the matter for investigation or protect him 
from harm.  Importantly, he did not claim, as he did in his complaint, that prison officials 
told the gang members that he had reported their behavior.  A grievance must, at a 
minimum, alert prison officials to “the nature of the wrong for which redress is sought.”  
Mack v. Warden Loretto FCI, 839 F.3d 286, 295 (3d Cir. 2016) (quoting Strong v. David, 
297 F.3d 646, 650 (7th Cir. 2002)).  Exhaustion requires that prisoners “provide enough 




III.  Rule 60(b)(6) motion 
 After the District Court granted summary judgment, Zuniga filed a motion 
pursuant to Rule 60(b)(6).  For the first time, he alleged that he was told by a prison 
official to not file any grievance until the investigation was over.  Zuniga did not state 
when he was informed that the investigation was over.  He did not allege that he 
informed prison officials of this when he submitted his first initial grievance or after the 
initial grievance was rejected as untimely.  Nor does he explain why he did not timely file 
a grievance when the prison officials allegedly informed Chavez and Hernandez in 
January 2015 of his allegations against him—the act that purportedly caused Zuniga to be 
in danger. 
 Zuniga also argued that his initial grievance was not rejected as untimely because 
the Warden responded to the grievance.  However, the Warden responded to #841063-F2, 
 
appropriate responsive measures.”  Id. at 296 (quoting Johnson v. Testman, 380 f.3d 691, 
697 (2d Cir. 2004)).   
The allegations of his grievance do not plead conditions posing a substantial risk 
of serious harm, that the prison officials were indifferent to that risk to his safety, or that 
any deliberate indifference caused the harm.  In Bistrian, the detainee alleged in one 
incident that jail officials were deliberately indifferent when they placed him in a locked 
recreation pen with an inmate with a history of violent assaults against other inmates.  
This Court held that the risk that “an inmate with a history of violence might attack 
another inmate for an unknown reason” was too speculative to state a claim of deliberate 
indifference by prison officials.  Bistrian, 696 F.3d at 371.  Here, the generalized 
allegations in Zuniga’s initial grievance that staff failed to protect him likewise do not 





the resubmitted grievance.  Moreover, the Warden stated that the response was for 
informational purposes only.   
 A litigant must show “extraordinary circumstances” to justify reopening a final 
judgment pursuant to Rule 60(b)(6).  Gonzalez v. Crosby, 545 U.S. 524, 535 (2005).  
Zuniga’s failure to make this important assertion regarding the timeliness of his first 
grievance before the District Court granted summary judgment does not constitute an 
extraordinary circumstance supporting the reopening of the District Court’s judgment.  
The District Court did not err in denying the Rule 60(b)(6) motion. 
IV. Conclusion 
 For the above reasons, we will affirm the District Court’s judgment.   
